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SYMPOSIUM

REGULATORY FEDERALISM: A REPRISE AND INTRODUCTION
George A. Bermann*

This colloquium, like its predecessor, proceeds on the basis of a series of
assumptions. First, it assumes that the federalism dimension of the regulatory
state is an important one Gust as is the regulatory dimension of the federal
state). In introducing our first colloquium, I suggested that, although determining
the content of public policy is critical in a democratic society, also critical is
determining the level of government at which the choice of policy is made.
Ingolf Pernice remarked then that a federal system is "any legal entity [which
is] comprised of states for the purpose of pursuing certain common ends and
which has been given, to this effect, the power to exercise limited but direct
jurisdiction over their citizens, but where for all other fields of public action the
individual states maintain their full autonomy." 1 If that is so, the inevitable
question is where and, perhaps more important, how the demarcation between
federal and state power should be drawn.
Assuming that policy on a given issue should, for one reason or another, be
made at the federal rather than state level, the further question arises whether the
general modalities of the federal intervention make a difference. One distinction
drawn in our first colloquium was between federalizing the law (i.e., displacing
state law with federal law) and harmonizing state law (i.e., imposing federal
standards on state law). On that occasion we noted that while the European
Community tends to favor using Community directives requiring the States to
modify their laws to meet European Community standards, the United States
favors outright federalization. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment, as explained in the
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case of New York v. United States,2 forbids federal commandeering of state
legislative apparatus. But if, under this view, the federal government must pay
for implementing its policies when the states refuse to do so, the consequence
may well in the end prove to be less federal regulation,3 with subsidiarity as the
practical result. This awareness and others lead to my second assumption that,
stylistically interesting though the difference between federalization and
harmonization may be, both approaches equally raise the "level of government"
issue.
Finally, I tum to the suggestion that we distinguish between, on the one hand,
fixing the proper level for making policy on a given issue and, on the other
hand, fixing the policy itself. Drawing such a distinction presents certain abstract
merits - like enabling the level of government that has the greatest interest in a
matter to assert that interest irrespective of its interest in any specific policy
outcome. At first glance, the Community law principle of subsidiarity seems to
presuppose that just such a separation can be made. It suggests that a polity can
raise and answer the question of power allocation in an abstract fashion. But,
even as the Europeans define it, subsidiarity cannot be treated in quite this way.
The principle, we are told, dictates that policy be made at the Member State
rather than the Community level, whenever the Community's policy objectives
can satisfactorily be met through action taken at the Member State level. Under
this view, the proper level of government action is not determined by reference
to a defined policy area, but by reference to a defined policy objective.
Ultimately, therefore, it is intellectually difficult, and perhaps impossible, to
identify the most appropriate level of government in isolation from the most
appropriate policy itself.
These, then, have been our basic assumptions: first, that level of government
matters; second, that federalization and harmonization alike raise that issue; and
third, that the who question invariably implicates the what question. It was on
the basis of these structural assumptions that we launched the inquiry around
which both this colloquium and its predecessor were organized. But we also
thought we needed to organize the inquiry around a sampling of policy areas in
which both regulation and federalism are issues. As Michael Bothe put it, the
real question, even after a general constitutional distribution of powers has been
laid down, "is the question [of] how the powers are actually used," which in
tum is very largely a "political question. " 4 "The attribution of specific powers
to specific levels of government does not tell the whole story . . . . " 5
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
"[F]ederalization may leave the states with Jess discretion with respect to particular subjects than
harmonization but it is more respectful of the states' legitimacy as independent decision-makers ....
[S]ome rule that limits the ability of the federal level of government to 'commandeer' the lower
level may be as likely to promote subsidiarity as a rule that attempts to limit the subject matter .
jurisdiction of the federal level of government." Richard Briffault, Paradoxes of Federalism, in FiRsT
SYMPOSIUM, supra note I at 52-53.
• Michael Bothe, Constitutional, Federal and Subsidiarity Issues, in FIRST SYMPOSIUM, supra note
l, at 58.
5 Id. at 59.
2

3
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lngolf Pernice and I believed that the most useful way to launch this second
colloquium would be by sharing our reflections on what the initial survey of
policy areas may have shown or failed to show, not only about our assumptions,
but about the demarcation of regulatory power in federal systems in general.
One possibility would be precisely a refutation of one or more of the basic
assumptions that we had made - assumptions about level of government
mattering, about federalizing and harmonizing being basically alike, and about
policy and power to make policy being inseparable. A second issue is whether
upon reflection, and borrowing Richard Briffault's terms, we have "a federal
system after all, despite the lack of a significant constitutional limitation on
federal power or constitutional reservation of particular subjects to the states. " 6
This means examining the adequacy of the guarantees in the European and
American Constitutions that their respective states shall enjoy a separate and
independent existence and an important role in the organization of the federal
government. Third and finally, one wonders, based on our survey, whether
European and American federalisms, viewed separately or together, show any
consistent pattern across different regulatory sectors.
I.

I will be very brief about the first two issues, and less brief about the third.
My first conclusion about the reports and comments is that nothing in them
undermines the three basic assumptions upon which we proceeded. To that
extent, they are reassuring. As to whether, despite the indeterminacy of the
constitutional limits on federal power, the states enjoy a separate and
independent existence and an important role in the organization of the federal
government, the reports and comments do not leave a great deal of room for
doubt.
II.

Turning to the third issue - the prospect of consistent patterns across policy
sectors within the United States, within Europe, and possibly even between the
United States and Europe - we need to be more cautious. We need to be more
cautious, if only because the reporters and commentators often failed to indicate
whether, in speaking of their subject matters in their federal systems, they were
speaking descriptively or prescriptively.
The reports and comments on environmental law insisted on drawing
distinctions. Speaking of Europe, Rehbinder thought that a high degree of
Community-wide environmental standard-setting for products could be justified
on the basis of the need to dismantle non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, but
that Community-wide standards should not be imposed on processes in the
absence of significant spillover effects and externalities. Rehbinder also
questioned whether the Community's environmental regulation was too one6

Briffault, supra note 3. at 50.
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directional, in setting standards that permit states to be more environmentally
stringent, but preclude them from being more environmentally lenient if they so
choose and might justifiably so choose. He believes Member States have good
reasons to pursue distinctive environmental policies: not only are their
environmental conditions different, but more important, they have different
social and economic priorities. While agreeing that the Community should be
alert to the risk that disparate environmental regulation will cause
"fragmentation" of the Community, he nevertheless calls for a greater measure
of what he terms "regional justice" or, even more colorfully, "substantive
regional due process." He finds such normative flexibility all the more
necessary, due to the serious problem of "implementation and enforcement
gaps" associated with the unfunded mandates and attempted commandeering on
the basis of which Community law federalism operates.7
If Rehbinder sounded a democracy and accountability theme in arguing for
more flexible European standards, his colleague Steinberg reached the same
conclusion on the basis of efficiency criteria. Warning that problems are not
global merely because they are universal, Steinberg argued that regionallydifferentiated standards offer greater promise of efficiency. Thus, except when
faced with substantial environmental externalities (or other truly global
considerations), Europe should welcome and exploit the advantages of regulatory
differentiation. 8 As an impetus, Steinberg would specifically give national
parliaments standing in the Court of Justice to challenge environmental and
other measures as being in violation of the principle of subsidiarity, a
prerogative they do not now have. 9 Even he would admit, however, that access
to the courts will accomplish little in the absence of justiciable substantive
standards for measuring subsidiarity, standards that may need to be developed on
a sector-by-sector basis.
Michael Young's prescription for U.S. federalism in the environmental law
field is ultimately not very different from these. He finds that where
environmental issues are heavily regional rather than national in nature, and
where more or less local values (rather than some national consensus) prevail,
both democratic values and efficiency values militate in favor of keeping
regulatory competence at the state and local level.
7 "[T]here certainly are better methods for achieving flexibility of Community law and
differentiating between different groups of Member States according to their ability to achieve
ambitious environmental policy goals than an uncoordinated 'two speeds' Europe through
implementation and enforcement gaps." Eckard Rehbinder, Regulatory Federalism: Environmental
Protection in the European Community, in FIRsT SYMPOSIUM. supra note 1, at 76-77.
8 Rudolf Steinberg, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Environmental Law, in FIRST
SYMPOSIUM. supra note 1. at 83-85.
9 Steinberg views giving Member State governments standing to challenge measures on
subsidiarity grounds as inadequate because of their temptations to compromise local preferences.
Failure to provide adequate recourse to the Court of Justice on subsidiarity challenges might well, in
his opinion, cause the German Constitutional Court to deliver on its threat to treat Community law
as invalid and unenforceable in Germany if violative, in its judgment, of the Community principle of
subsidiarity.
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In the field of labor law, Mark Barenberg discerned still finer distinctions. He
posited four different models of American labor federalism: 1) national
uniformity (the law of collective bargaining and pension rights), 2) federal
minimum standards (employment discrimination, health and safety, and wages
and hours), 3) state implementation of federal criteria (welfare and Medicaid),
and 4) state primacy (workers' compensation and the law of unjust dismissals).
It appears to be his thesis that the allocation of labor law issues among these
different models reflects a sensitivity to the problems of "social dumping." 10
The German authors staked out positions that were quite different from
Barenberg's and quite different from each other's. Weiss claims that the
Community may have erred in pursuing what he calls a "perfectionist
perspective" in labor law harmonization, 11 by pursuing uniform sets of
substantive rights and duties, rather than more attainable, and ultimately useful,
structural harmonization. Simitis, on the other hand, believes that labor law is an
area that raises such serious issues of human welfare and dignity that the
Community simply cannot afford to indulge in the presumed benefits of
regulatory competition and public choice. 12 Federalism in this particular area
should, in his view, unashamedly promote the introduction of progressive,
individual rights-oriented measures, that is to say "close the gap between the
working conditions in its Member States and . . . set . . . the pace for constant
improvement of the working environment." 13 Under his view of the field, a
"race to the bottom" is simply intolerable.
This "race to the bottom" is precisely the risk that Professors Goldschmid
and Lowenstein tend to see in America's failure to federalize or harmonize state
corporation law - a risk admittedly compensated for in part by its willingness
to federalize and vigorously enforce securities law in the interest of investor
protection. In reaching this conclusion, Goldschmid invoked the following test:
action should be taken at the highest government levels on issues that are
"basic," that term denoting issues "that are truly important and that are likely to
be improperly regulated ... at lower governmental levels." 14 Curiously, neither
of the German speakers was persuaded that regulatory competition among states
had seriously prejudiced the American public, and neither thought that it was
likely to prejudice the European public either. Fritz Kubler believes, in fact, that
in the United States regulatory competition has been a "permanent incentive for
corporate law reform;" 15 and Helmut Kohl doubts, on the basis of the "real seat
10
Mark Barenberg, Federalism and American Labor Law: Toward a Critical Mapping of the
"Social Dumping" Question, in FlRST SYMPOSIUM, supra note 1, at 105.
11
Jon Appleton, Summary: Subsidiarity and Harmonization within Federal Systems; Contradiction
or Necessary Parts of the Same?, in FIRsT SYMPOSIUM, supra note l, at 191 (quoting Weiss).
12 Spiros Simitis, Labor Relations - The European Union's Problem Child, in FIRST SYMPOSIUM,
supra note l, at 125.
13 ld.
14 Harvey J. Goldschmid, Harmonization of Corporate Law in Federal Systems: A United States
Perspective, in FIRST SYMPOSIUM, supra note 1, at 168.
15
Friedrich Kiibler, "Legislative Competition" and Corporate Law Reform: Some Questions from
a European Perspective, in FIRST SYMPOSIUM, supra note 1, at 172.
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rule" of incorporation prevalent in Europe, that the "Delaware effect" is, in any
event, a realistic concern there. 16
Despite their many evident divergences, the reports and comments have this
important and too easily overlooked fact in common: they are less concerned
with the ultimate allocation of rulemaking power in a given area than with the
soundness of the reasoning by which that allocation is made. Thus, while all of
the reports and comments take federalism and . the demarcation of powers
seriously, all seem to be less interested in the what, or even the who, of the
demarcation than in the how of it.
Of course, asking the how question inevitably means asking the why question
as well. Certainly, in the European Community it has been helpful in thinking
about harmonization to ask whether (and to what extent) state law is being
harmonized in order, on the one hand, to eliminate internal non-tariff barriers to
trade (i.e. in pursuit of "negative integration") or, on the other, to establish a
minimum level of social protection (i.e. in pursuit of "positive integration"). In
the internal market context, the principle of subsidiarity may be thought of as
seeking to ensure that local autonomy is not interfered with, unless the gains in
mobility of the factors of production are substantial and palpable; in other
words, even though market integration could conceivably be cited to justify total
standardization in every field, subsidiarity reminds us that at some point the
putative gains in market integration are simply not worth it.
On the other hand, in areas where the Community is exercising the right to
set substantive standards of social protection, subsidiarity offers a somewhat
different rule of decision. It suggests that the Community set minimum standards
only (with states allowed, within limits of course, to exceed them), that these
standards address only the essentials of any given matter, and that states even be
given the right, in compelling circumstances, to fall short of them.
In the end, of course, no amount of analytic rigor will supplant talk about
values and assessments about whether what we value is or is not prejudiced by
allowing regulation to occur at one or another level of government. But clarity
of thought - particularly on the how and the why - cannot possibly hurt.

m.
There is another, perfectly complementary approach that may help in
circumstances such as these, where disagreements over values are bound to color
our preferences on the "level of government" question. That approach may be
described as an institutional or structural one. This approach posits that the best
results, from a federalism point of view, will be attained if the decisional
machinery operates under the right institutional ground rules.
In fact, there are rather clear signs of an ascendancy of institutional federalism
in the United States. Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that, in the Court's
16 Kohl attributes the absence of a "Delaware effect" in Europe to the so-called "real seat
theory," according to which companies are required to incorporate in the jurisdiction where they
principally conduct their business.
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view, health in federalism depends not so much on the specific allocation of
substantive policymaking power as on certain basic ground rules for the exercise
of that power. As already noted, the decision in New York v. United States 17
suggests that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from compelling the states to
administer (i.e. commit enforcement resources to) federally-determined policies.
The Supreme Court's more recent Eleventh Amendment ruling in Seminole Tribe
v. Florida 18 largely bars Congress from subjecting the states to litigation and
liability in the federal courts; this case law thus places certain structural
limitations on Congress's power to determine the state governments' allocation
of resources or to fix the terms on which the states may be held accountable in
law. And even though the decision in United States v. Lopez 19 places limits on
Congress's exercise of the interstate commerce power, those limits hardly
amount to reserving specific subject matters for governance by the states. The
Lopez case stands at most for the proposition that if Congress invokes the
Commerce Clause, commerce must be implicated and such commerce must at
least have a potential interstate dimension.
It may be significant in this "institutional" connection that the present
colloquium includes a panel on public finance. That choice itself constitutes
recognition of the fact that sectoral policy lines are not necessarily the most
useful ones to follow in a comparative study of federalism. Federalism, after all,
is not simply the result of the exercise of placing certain policy issues on the
federal side and certain other policy issues on the state side of the boundary
(while allowing still other issues to straddle the boundary altogether). It is also
the result of institutional arrangements. Precisely because public finance law
raises questions about the resource dependence of the states on the federal
government, or of the federal government on the states, it illustrates a federalism
based on institutional arrangements rather than on an allocation of subject matter
competences.
Perhaps the most direct institutional strategy for strengthening federalism
would consist of structuring federal decisionmaking so as actually to enhance the
ability of state and local governments to make their interests known at the time
the federal government determines whether, and if so how, to regulate. It is too
late in the day merely to assume that our federal systems exhibit adequate
political safeguards of federalism; but it is not too late to act to strengthen
existing safeguards and introduce new ones. Put in the most general terms, we
might pursue strategies that enhance the likelihood that representatives of state
and local communities will have a precise and identifiable function to perform in
the decisionmaking process. Reverting to the who versus the what, those
representatives would focus more on the question of whether a problem exists,
and whether the federal government should address it, than on the merits of the
solution itself.
17
1s
19

505 U.S. 144.
116 S. Ct 1114 (1996).
115 S. Ct 1624 (1995).
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Alternatively, the decisional focus of state and local governments might be on
the different effects that various federal solutions would have on state and local
communities - something along the lines of a "state and local government
resources and autonomy impact assessment." My idea is that some creative
institutional thinking might produce decisional processes that will more reliably
yield federal measures - whether federalization or harmonization does not
matter - "that [are] respectful of all relevant state and local needs, and all
significant state and local differences. " 20 Although the very task of weighing the
interests of state and local communities in federal decisionmaking implies a
heavy informational and judgmental burden, the representatives of those
communities would seem to be in a good position to determine for themselves
the issues on which their interests are most worth pursuing.
Interestingly, the European Community has from the very start
institutionalized the influence of state interests in the formation of federal policy
by structuring its principal legislative organ - the Council of Ministers - in a
way that permits members to give voice to the interests of their states as they
perceive them. 21 Clearly, judging by popular opinion, this has not provided an
adequate set of political safeguards of federalism for Europe - which only
shows that neither institutional nor allocational "quick fixes" will accomplish
the task.

20
George A. Bennann, Harmonization and Regulatory Federalism, in FIRST SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 1, at 44.
21
Michael Bothe refers to this arrangement as Politikverjlechtung, or "vertical political
interlacing." Bothe, supra note 4, at 59.

